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By design or by default, all sociology performs the
function of enlightenment. That function, though,
can be addressed to the managers of public order or
to men and women set in its frame and making their
life choices within it. There is broad tendency in
contemporary sociology to reorient the enlighten-
ment task from the first addressee to the second.
This tendency is accompanied by the retreat from
the ambition to model sociological work after the
natural-scientific pattern and an effort to incorporate
into the body of sociological theory and practice of
the fact of the endemic contingency, irregularity and
under-determination of human conduct: in short, of
human freedom of choice and human responsibility
for the choices made or desisted.
Zygmunt Bauman
Sociological
Enlightenment
- for whom,
about what?
Zygmunt Bauman is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the Universities of Leeds
and Warsaw.
44
Two Enlightenments
In his introductory words to this two-
day celebration of the opening of the
Sociology Programme in Aalborg, Jens
Tonboe told us that now, once the birth
pangs are over and technicalities out of
the way, he “gradually encounters all
the problems and tries to see them as
challenges and possibilities”. He gave us
thus the definition of what human life
sensibly lived is about, Henri Bergson
defined living beings by their ability to
turn obstacles into resources.
Professor Tonboe names some of
those challenges, specific to sociology.
He speaks of the “Increasing lack of
ethics and moral... coupled with anxie-
ty, and discontents” - “a surging unrest
of anxiety, insecurity, even fear, dread
and aggression”. He then explains why
these signs of our times are challenges
to sociologists: Because of the loss of
sense of connection between private
fears and collective conditions and re-
solutions. We, the sociologists, must -
he says - “insist on micro in macro per-
spective” - and “bridge the polarisation
between the personal-individual and
the global”. While doing so, we may,
hopefully, “provide the confused indi-
vidual... with a clarifying picture of his
actual global social reality permitting
him to produce, to change or recreate
that reality from a more solid basis”.
I could not put it better. In a nutshell,
Jens Tonboe captured the nature of the
changing enlightenment challenge con-
fronting sociology: From enlightening
the despot wishing to homogenise, to
streamline and discipline - to enlighten-
ing the human individual about the infi-
nite and infinitely varied collective en-
tanglements of his choices and their
consequences. From supplying the
means to trim down human freedom,
to offering help in proper use of that
freedom and so reforging human fate
into consciously embraced destiny and
life vocation.
Dream one: Science of human
order
Since it became conscious of its own se-
parate existence and gave itself a name
of its own, sociology was preoccupied
with ‘social order’: That is, with pat-
tern, structure, regularity in human af-
fairs, and with all kinds of devices that
bring them about and protect - that ma-
ke or would make various human be-
ings behave alike and in a predictable
manner. In The Structure of Social Action,
the book which was meant to sum up
the first hundred years of sociological
thought while charting the roads for
further centuries of sociological inquiry,
and seen by many people and for many
years as astonishingly successful in both
these tasks - Talcott Parsons informed
his readers that since its inception socio-
logy struggled with the solution to the
‘Hobbesian problem’, that is preoccupi-
ed with the mystery of people living
with each other in a by-and-large order-
ly and peaceful fashion despite the fact
that each one of them pursued wilfully
his own gains and pleasures. This was
a mystery, was it not? The humans, each
one of them having a will of one’s own
and acting on that will to reach his or
her own purposes, and yet doing re-
markably similar things in similar cir-
cumstances, and doing them repeatedly
- as if they did not have that free will at
all or as if that free will which they had
had been cancelled out and did not mat-
ter.... And cracking that mystery was for
all founding fathers of sociology - for
Marx, Durkheim or Weber alike - the
major, perhaps the sole concern.
Cracking that mystery was - on the
top of anything else - the essential con-
dition of raising sociology to the level
of science. All science, whatever its sub-
45
ject-matter, proceeds in the same fash-
ion: It seeks and discovers regularities
behind apparent contingency of events,
necessities behind accidents, determi-
nation behind contingency. All science
is ultimately about how things must be
- not just how they are, how they hap-
pen to be here or there, in this or another
place. All science, in other words,
reaches beyond the events which the
scientists observe - proceeds beyond the
observation of events down to the ne-
cessary connections between things,
such as may be sometimes concealed,
but never violated. All science, as they
say, goes beneath the surface to the heart
of the matter; or, as philosophers would
say - beyond the phenomena, to the es-
sence.
Sociology - since it deals with hu-
mans - is admittedly handicapped in
this respect when compared with the
scientists who study stars or rocks. The
only hurdle those other scientists need
to overcome is the sluggishness of their
own imagination or errors committed
in the course of their observations and
experiments. If something appears to
happen which does not look like what
they expected to happen, they need on-
ly to go once more through their notes
and re-test their laboratory equipment.
They need not be, and they are not,
haunted by the suspicion that perhaps
the stars and the rocks themselves con-
spire to defy the iron laws that rule
them; that they may choose to behave
now one way, now another; that they
may ‘act’ instead of simply ‘behaving’,
be perverse, capricious, obstreperous or
erratic and not at all subject to any laws.
Not having such doubts is the luxu-
ry available to the students of stars and
rocks, but not, alas, to the students of
human affairs. To pierce one’s way to
invariable patterns and rules through
the thicket of diverse and often way-
ward human actions takes more than
the refinement of one’s own tools of in-
quiry - a better phrased and structured
questionnaire, for instance. It demands
that the rule-disturbing power of hu-
man will, the profound difference be-
tween ‘in order to’ and ‘because of’, be-
tween the ‘actions’ which are guided by
subjective motives and ‘behaviour’
which is determined by objective cau-
ses, are somehow argued away so that
it may be declared that in the last ac-
count (and it is the last account that
matters in science) such differences do
not make any difference.
However sharply different in virtu-
ally every other aspect was the social-
scientific activity which they wished to
legislate into existence, the two foun-
ding fathers of modern sociology, Durk-
heim and Weber, were unanimous as to
one injunction: Whatever else the social
scientists do, they need to treat the lay
accounts of living experience with sus-
picion. Never trust the laypersons re-
porting their motives. At best, they
would have but a dim and foggy idea
of what makes them tick; it is up to the
social scientists to see their conduct
coolly and clearly, and this thanks to the
possession of qualities which layper-
sons, being laypersons, cannot have:
Thanks to the ability to look beyond the
realm of subjectively lived experience,
see beyond the life-world of mortal in-
dividuals into the immortality of the
group, “something greater than oursel-
ves” (Durkheim); or thanks to the me-
thod of cleansing that life-world of the
perishable, putrifiable fleshy parts so
that its indestructible (since incorpo-
real) skeleton made of values, concepts
and logical rules is laid bare (Weber).
Both strategies are, however, poor sub-
stitutes for the natural scientist’s radical
break with the lay people’s quotidian-
ness. At the end of the long and tor-
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tuous pilgrimage to scientific serenity,
the Durkheimian and Weberian scho-
lars still speak of classes, states, statu-
ses, power or prestige - not of the pro-
tons or electrons, black holes or big
bangs. Neither of the two will ever fully
succeed in their joint litigation to legally
disempower the laypeople and to ex-
propriate their objects of study, the lay-
persons’, of their right of speech; the ac-
complishments which so matter-of-
factly fell into the hands of the ‘natural
scientist’ is beyond their reach.
Dream two: Natural
science of the humans
It seems today certain beyond reasonab-
le doubt that not much of the natural-
scientific certainty will ever rub off onto
human studies. But it looks equally cer-
tain that virtually none of the typical
human scientists’ stomach pains are li-
kely ever to be experienced at first hand
by the student of nature (impostures in-
tellectuals, the recent angry - as much
as puzzled and contused - reaction of
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, was only
to be expected!). Failing to note these
two truths can be only blamed on the
illusion of grandeur in the first case, or
the frantic search of self-apology and
forgiveness in the second.
Nature is numb. It was what it was,
much in the shape it is now, well before
the construction of the Tower of Babel
was attempted and abandoned and
even before Adam was told by God to
give things their names.... Nature does
not speak. It does not tell its own story
- the story must be told by those speak-
ing animals, the humans, who cast it as
nature; and once the story has been told,
there is no point in asking Nature to
agree - the sole agreement which is
sought by the story-tellers, and the only
consent that can be found, is one be-
tween this story and other stories told
by others and held correct.
Not by all others to be sure, not by
any Tom, Dick and Harry; only by such
others whose opinion count - those ot-
hers who muster enough power to pro-
nounce on the matter of correctness, of
the truth of some stories and falsity of
others. The great French philosopher of
science Gaston Bachelard traced the
beginning of science as the modern
mind would recognise as being science
and we understand it now to the appea-
rance of first accounts of nature that
started not from the discussion of com-
monly seen and familiar phenomena,
but from the reference to concepts and
theories known solely to the readers
(and writers) of scientific books; in other
words, to the division between the
scientist and laypeople, between scien-
tific discourse and vernacular, popular,
daily speech - to what is called in philo-
sophical language the ‘self-referentiali-
ty’ of scientific narrative. In order to
check her account of laboratory or ob-
servatory experience, the scientists
must refer to accounts given by other
‘like them’ - people speaking, from oth-
er laboratories or observatories. There
would be no point in listening to what
the rest - ‘lay’, ‘non-specialist’ people -
have to say; never crossing the door of
a laboratory or observatory, such people
have simply nothing of relevance to say
- they have not experienced what can
be experienced only inside the laborato-
ry walls and thus have no story of their
own to tell.
But the narratives of humanities,
sociology including, are accounts of
events that are experienced and given
verbal form and talked about by ‘ordi-
nary’ humans, by any humans; they are
stories told about human experience ac-
cessible to all. And the scholarly tellers
of such stories cannot be self-referential.
This statement can be seen as a pleo-
47
nasm, or as a definition of humanities:
Humanities are the narratives that tell
the story of the humans as speaking sub-
jects.
True, that quality of humans may be
still disregarded, and is disregarded in
many a story told about humans; but
when it is disregarded it is not human
experience - Erlebnis - that the story is
about. In as far as they recognise their
objects as speaking subjects, all humani-
ties, sociology being no exception, are
meeting places of stories; or, rather, they
are stories told about stories. The stories
with which the stories told by humaniti-
es must seek agreement are not just the
stories spun by other ‘human scientists’,
but the stories told by the objects - the
heroes and the villains - of the stories.
This circumstance alone casts already
humanities into a situation radically dif-
ferent from those sought and found by
‘hard science’ - that is by investigative
practice which cast their objects as Na-
ture, to wit a numb being, a being which
does not have its own story to tell. The
difference, roughly, is that between si-
lence and the voice of the object. And
the side-line is that in humanities, un-
like in science, the dividing boundary
between the experts and the laypeople,
between those with the right to tell the
stories with authority and those who
are allowed only to listen and take note,
is far from obvious and difficult to
draw, let alone to defend.
Humanities neither need nor can de-
putise for the numb and speechless Na-
ture. The realities they explore are nei-
ther inarticulate nor speechless; on the
contrary, they are made up of words, and
the words are spoken. The realities with
which sociologist have to deal had been
human realities well before the telling
of the stories by humanities took off;
and they had been realities not in spite,
but because they were ‘human realities’,
given in human experience - lived
through by humans, interpreted by hu-
mans, given names by humans, told
and retold by humans. And so the cove-
ted immunity to objections - called ‘cer-
tainty’ - does not come to humanities
naturally, and obtaining it is not easy.
In humanities, it is the matter of stories
against stories; of the perpetual contest
about the right to speak and validity of
the stories, never ending skirmishes
along the constantly drawn and re-
drawn boundary between competent
speech and ‘mere commonsense’. Hu-
manities are not the immature younger
brothers of ‘better established’ or ‘bet-
ter equipped’ brands of science. They
are an entirely different kind of activity
altogether. They will never be ‘like na-
tural sciences‘.
Never? This is not exactly true. The
Humanities may (conceivably) rise to a
scientific status in a world in which
their speaking/interpreting human sub-
jects descend (or are pushed) to the sta-
tus of speechless objects; in a world re-
made after the likeness of concentration
camps. In totalitarian societies which re-
duce their subjects to the order-follow-
ing routine (or so it may seem for a time;
as our recent experience shows, even
in societies made after the pattern of
concentration camps the inmates tend
to recover sooner or later their voices).
The snag is, though, that - as historical
experience abundantly shows - in such
a society not just the voice of their re-
search objects, but of the humanities
themselves tends to be stifled.... Little
have we heard of scientific exploration
of human mysteries accomplished un-
der totalitarian conditions. The huma-
nities cannot ‘rise’ to scientific status as
long as they stay alive. They wither and
die the moment the target comes near -
just like that legendary horse which, to
the dismay of its owner, expired when
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its training to do without food was
coming close to successful completion.
An unresolvable paradox lies at the
foundation of all humanities, sociology
included. They are born out of an auto-
nomous society - one that in Cornelius
Castoriadis’ words “self-institutes expli-
citly and reflexively”, knowing well that
all significations it creates have no guar-
antee external to itself; and yet all their
efforts is directed towards closure of sig-
nification, which - if reached - would shut
off political, philosophical, ethical as
well as aesthetic questions. Humanities
owe their raison d’être, their subject-mat-
ter, to the multitude of speaking sub-
jects, the richness of their Erlebnisse, the
variety of their stories; humanities have,
so to speak, vested interests in the plu-
rality of human experience, humanities
feed on human variety and difference.
And yet for the most part of their mo-
dern history humanities - sociology
most prominent among them - tried
hard to overcome that variety, to produ-
ce a story that would invalidate all oth-
er, previously told and even the yet
untold stories; to replace variety with
unity, discord with agreement, many
voices with one voice. It was as if huma-
nities were bent on suicide, wishing to
cut off the branch on which they were
sitting, to destroy the purpose of their
very existence, to deprive themselves
of the reason to be.
As to the sociologists - they were wa-
ry of degrading and shameful kinship
with other humanities and angry if re-
minded of their family roots. They hotly
denied sharing in the humanities’ weak-
nesses, joined in the praise of science
as not just a different, but superior, per-
haps the only decent, kind of knowled-
ge, and declared their determination to
cross camps, whatever the price of ad-
mission might be. I myself, inadvertent-
ly, gave about two decades ago expres-
sion to that bizarre, hardly congruent
stance when following the tip taken
from Jürgen Habermas I concluded my
Hermeneutics and Social Science with a
statement that good sociology, like a
good social worker, wishes to work it-
self out of its job; and that in the case of
sociology this desire is acted upon in
the effort to eliminate discord which is
invariably a product of ‘distorted com-
munication’, of misunderstandings and
improper interpretations; and to replace
conditions which bar understanding
and induce wrong interpretations with
other conditions, such as facilitate
agreement and consensus.
The great awakening
And so we return to where we have
started: Sociology, a truly modern in-
vention, considered the discovery, the
explanation and the promotion of order,
regularity and predictability in human
universe to be its prime task. In selec-
ting order as its cognitive horizon and
objective, sociology was in tune not only
with modern science, but with modern
politics as well.
The pre-modern state was a game-
keeper state: It presided over a ‘natural
order’ of things, a ‘divine chain of be-
ings’ that kept re-creating itself appa-
rently without any human help and re-
sented all human interference. Modern
state is a gardener state; it is in charge
of an order which otherwise would not
come about or survive. For the ‘natural
order’, which either collapsed or ceased
to satisfy, the modern state substitutes
an artificial one - one that must be legis-
lated into existence and protected by the
state’s enforcing powers. For a modern
state order is not a ‘given’, but a task.
Modern state being what it is, order
remains target of its acute attention and
concern. Modern state is about setting
the rules, defining patterns and main-
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taining them, administration, manage-
ment, surveillance and supervision; it
is also about staving off or preventing
all deviance from the pattern and all
breaching of the rule: Everything
haphazard, erratic, un-anticipated and
accidental.
That preoccupation of modern
thought and practice with order was all
the more obsessive for the fact that the
reality of modern existence at any time
was anything but orderly. And so that
order with which modern thought and
practice concerned themselves was at
all times (to use Serge Moscovici’s ex-
pression) a “regressive fantasy”. It was
indeed regressive, since it amounted to
an idea and an effort to reduce complex-
ity and variety of the human world, to
cut down the number of stories told, to
narrow down the range of alternative
scenarios. And it was a fantasy - since
the postulated patterns stayed always,
stubbornly, a step or two ahead of
reality and no reality already achieved
matched exactly the form which it was
prodded or prompted to assume.
But fantasising about order, and giv-
ing those fantasies a regressive bent,
had anything but imagined, fantastic
causes. It was (and it still is, to be sure)
firmly rooted in the selfsame reality of
modern existence which it strove to
foreclose, reform and ultimately to
overcome. The most distinctive mark
of that reality is high degree of uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty rules supreme and
in every field of life; we are uncertain
about the outcomes of our actions,
about other people reactions to them,
about propriety and wisdom of our de-
cisions, about what the future has in
store and how sound are our invest-
ment into it - we cannot be fully sure
even about our own identity which is
always an unfinished project, always a
prospect as uncertain as everything
else. Modern society was - long before
Ulrich Beck gave it that name - a Risiko-
gesellschaft, and living in such a society
was and remains a Risikoleben.
Taking risks, particularly if you hap-
pen to be an adventurous spirit, is often
exhilarating, but it may be also off-put-
ting and unnerving, particularly if no
resolutions of doubt is in sight. The dan-
gers lurking in protracted and prospect-
less risk-taking are easy to see and have
been widely noted and recorded. As Ju-
dith Square put it recently,
apparently secure walls, delimi-
ting our sense of self, proved to
be but permeable membranes....
In the face of insecurity about our
limits and the realisation of the
possibility of continuity, we all
too often witness, not the celebra-
tion of new possibilities, but a re-
treat into fortress identities, the
strategic use of the massive, re-
gressive common denominators
of essential identities. (Squares
1996:187).
It has become common to assume that
the phenomenon Squares noted is es-
sentially a new condition, due to a num-
ber of factors summed up in the concept
of ‘crisis of modernity’. Whether the vo-
lume of uncertainty involved in the life-
process has grown indeed radically in
our times of post- or late-modernity is
a moot question and it is not at all clear
how one could go about answering it -
that is, how could one measure the vo-
lume of uncertainty ‘objectively’. What
does not seem, however, contentious,
is that the perception of uncertainty, and
so also the acuity with which it is felt
and feared, has changed considerably;
and this because our post- or late-mo-
dern condition is, as Sean Cubitt puts
it, “a time without reassuring vision of
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future enlightenment, rationality and
wealth that inspired the architects of
modernity” (Cubitt 1996:47). Or (to pa-
raphrase Jonathan Freedman of Lund)
because we are still modern but no mo-
re modernists, meaning that we enter-
tain no reasonable and credible plans
how to get rid of all that we experience
as unpleasant and vexing in being mo-
dern. And, as Anthony Giddens sums
up the current mood - we are particular-
ly pessimistic about the chances of over-
coming uncertainty as we realise that
more often than not our uncertainty is
a manufactured uncertainty and that
more knowledge brings more, rather
than less, of it.
Modernity promised to replace un-
certainty with an orderly human uni-
verse in which futures can be planned
and systematically pursued - and mo-
dern philosophers and political leaders
alike set earnestly about fulfilling that
promise. Sociologists followed suit -
hoping to assist the thinkers and the
doers with reliable information about
how human conduct of the desirable
sort may be obtained and how to solicit
the kind of compliance and conformity
to the legally set rules that would put
paid to interpretative disagreements
and behavioural uncertainty. But the
promise to conquer and annihilate un-
certainty, if repeated nowadays, sounds
hollow, while people resourceful
enough to do the conquest are few and
far between and altogether difficult to
trust. There seem to be few takers for
the orthodox sociology gifts - and a fast
shrinking demand for the kind of pro-
duct which the orthodox sociologists
had become past masters in assembling.
American sociology used to set the
pattern for sociological services to social
order; no wonder that it is in the United
States that one can hear the loudest
alarms about crisis of sociology. Not just
a ‘coming crisis’, of which Alvin Gould-
ner wrote quarter of a century ago ho-
ping that spotting it would be the be-
ginning of successful therapy, but a cri-
sis which has already arrived, took
roots all around and has no intention
to move away. American sociology, as
Anthony Giddens put it recently, faces
the daunting task of “reconnecting to
public policy-making agenda” (Gid-
dens 1996:5). Presumably, it has lost its
past connection which no more than
twenty or thirty years ago seemed secu-
re and well-nigh unbreakable; or, which
seems to be more to the point, it is the
public agenda itself that changed in a
way which took the orthodox sociology
unawares and unprepared, or a new
sockets have been installed in the pub-
lic policy sphere for which sociology has
yet to find proper plugs and capacious
enough cables.
The new agenda
And yet there is a public policy agenda
to which sociology has all the chances
of connecting, providing it recognizes
the changed meanings of both ‘public
agenda’ and ‘connection’ and draws
from that recognition the right conclu-
sions for its own strategy.
The new public agenda, still await-
ing its public policy, is emerging in the
void left by the past ‘reassuring visions’.
Indeed, as long as the diversity, ambiva-
lence and contingency were cast by
those visions as merely temporary irri-
tants which soon would go away and
be replaced by homogeneity - Eindeutig-
keit and rationality, there was no strong
motive to consider the consequences of
uncertainty entailed in human condi-
tion. Uncertainty did not seem endemic
to that condition, and ‘acting under
conditions of uncertainty’ seemed both
marginal and abnormal - and above all
transient and curable. In the absence of
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such visions, however, it becomes ever
more clear that uncertainty is here to
stay, that acting without full inventory
of the factors involved, without fool-
proof recipes and without knowledge
of the whole range of consequences is
the norm rather than a freak and avoid-
able happening and constitutes an inte-
gral, irremovable part of human condi-
tion. And the public agenda, whatever
shape it might yet take, is going to be
made by men and women aware of that
and thus preoccupied first and foremost
with the ways and means of choice-
evaluation and risk-avoidance; by men
and women increasingly aware of their
freedom and everything that comes
with freedom, including such unplea-
sant associates like perpetual insecurity,
the necessity to choose and to accept
one’s own responsibility for the choices.
The late Iosif Brodski defined a free man
as one who does not complain in case
of defeat.
However sociology might be con-
nected to such a public agenda, it must
plug itself to the hopes and worries of
men and women cast in the condition
of freedom.
The lot of a free agent is full of anti-
nomies not easy to take stock of, let alo-
ne to disentangle. Consider, for instan-
ce, the contradictions of self-made iden-
tities which must be solid enough to be
acknowledged as such and yet flexible
enough not to bar freedom of move-
ment in constantly changing, volatile
circumstances. Or the precariousness of
human partnerships, now burdened
with greater than ever expectations yet
poorly, if at all, institutionalised and the-
refore less resistant to the added bur-
den. Or the sorry plight of the reposses-
sed responsibility, sailing dangerously
between the rocks of indifference and
coercion. Or the fragility of all common
action, which has solely the enthusiasm
and dedication of the actors to rely on
and yet needs more lasting adhesive to
retain its integrity as long as it takes to
reach its purpose. Or the notorious dif-
ficulty to generalise the experiences
which are lived-through as thoroughly
personal and subjective into problems
fit to be inscribed into the public agenda
and become matters of public policy.
These are but few off-hand examples,
but they offer a fair view of the kind of
challenge now facing sociologists wish-
ing to ‘reconnect’ their discipline to the
public policy agenda. All of them call
for a lot of sociological study and medi-
tation, all of them urgently require so-
ciological services.
The second Enlightenment
At the start of the great modern adven-
ture les philosophes, the prophets and de-
signers of the new - fair, just, reasonable
- human order, dreamed of an enlighte-
ned despot as the mighty executor of
their plans. It was up to the philoso-
phers to draw the right blueprints, and
up to the ruler, advised by the philoso-
phers, to make their word flesh by in-
stalling the right legal order and enfor-
cing it. That strategy of enlightenment
aimed at the all powerful and despotic
ruler and the project to change the con-
ditions of the ‘ordinary folk’ through
the ruler’s action left it stamp on the
social thought of the modern era. Whe-
ther enthusiastic or critical about the
shape which modern society has taken,
social thinkers tended to view society
as a whole and every part of it which
came under their microscope ‘from the
top’, from the manager’s office, from
the control desk - as above all a collec-
tion of ‘problems’ to be ‘resolved’ and
an object of administration meant to se-
cure smooth running of daily business
and avoidance of friction. Sociology ela-
borated on that strategic principle - de-
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veloping on the one hand a systemic,
and on the other a statistical, demogra-
phic view of society, both of practical
interest to people undertaking manage-
rial tasks. And the task of every mana-
gement is to get things done according
to plan, whatever are the feelings, wish-
es and preferences of those whose la-
bour is necessary for the plan’s imple-
mentation. When society is viewed as
an object of management, the ‘en-
lightenment’ needed is the art of rende-
ring all potentially disturbing, random
factors like intentions and purposes of
individuals, harmless - that is, irrele-
vant to the success of the plan. The idea
of ‘enlightened despot’ captures well
the essence of that strategy.
In the ‘enlightened despot’ version
of Enlightenment it is the result - the
rationally structured and run society -
that counts. Individual wills, desires
and purposes, individual vis formandi
and libido formandi, the poïetic propen-
sity to create new significations with no
regard to function, use and purpose -
are but so many resources, or for that
matter obstacles, on the road. But in a
democratic society the emphasis and
priorities rebel against that perspective:
It is precisely those wills, desires and
purposes, and their satisfaction, that
count and need to be honoured. Demo-
cratic society is one that militates
against all schemes of perfection impo-
sed against the wishes, or in disregard
of the wishes, of the men and women
who are embraced by the generic name
of ‘society’. If despotism means an ac-
tion undertaken and perpetrated ‘from
the top’, democracy consist in actions
arising ‘from the bottom up’. The sole
‘totality’ recognised and acceptable to
a democratic society is one emergent
out of the actions of creative and freely
choosing individuals.
In the service rendered to a demo-
cratic society, the kind of enlightenment
which sociology is capable of delivering
is directed to such freely choosing indi-
viduals; sociology is a service to a de-
mocratic society in as far as it enhances
and reinforces that freedom of choice,
reopens rather than closes the work of
signification. It is the self-formation of
the individual men and women that in
the result of sociological enlightenment
may gain in fairness, justice and ratio-
nality. To do so, or at least to try its best
to do so, though, sociology needs a
thorough rethinking and rehashing of
its orthodox strategy, developed in the
service of managerial task. In the words
of Cornelius Castoriadis:
an autonomous society, a truly
democratic society, is a society
which question everything that
is pre-given and by the same to-
ken liberates the creation of new
meaning. In such a society, all in-
dividuals are free to create for
their lives the meanings they will
(and can).... The individualised
individual creates the meaning of
life while participating in the
meanings created by society, par-
ticipating in their creation, once
as an ‘author’, once as a ‘reci-
pient’ (public) of those meanings.
And I always insist on the fact
that true ‘reception’ of a new
work is always as creative as its
creation.... (Castoriadis 1996:63).
A truly democratic society, composed
of meaning-creating individuals,
“knows, must know, that there are no
‘assured’ meanings, that it lives on the
surface of chaos, that it itself is a chaos
seeking a form, but a form that is never
fixed once for all” (Castoriadis 1996:65).
The absence of guaranteed meanings -
of absolute truths, of preordained
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norms of conduct, of pre-drawn border-
lines between right and wrong, of guar-
anteed rules of successful action - is the
condition sine qua non of a truly autono-
mous society and a truly free individual
- while autonomous society and free-
dom of its members condition each oth-
er. Whatever safety democracy and in-
dividuality may muster, depends not on
fighting the endemic contingency and
uncertainty of human condition but on
recognizing it and facing its consequ-
ences point blank.
This statement goes against the grain
of the orthodox strategy putting order,
that fore-closure of significations, as the
top priority - and from the point of view
of that strategy may indeed feel like a
mind-boggling paradox. No wonder
that whenever sociology is militating
against the absolute pretences and the
contrived universality of norms it is ac-
cused of aiding and abetting moral and
cognitive nihilism. But to be against the
absolute truth and ultimate foundation
does not mean taking side of nihilism.
Nihilism - that ‘everything goes’ pos-
ture - means moral indifference seeking
justification in the allegedly equal va-
lue, and therefore equal worthlessness
of competing norms. The human condi-
tion which sociology needs to serve is
however marked not by the absence of
values and valid norms, but precisely
by its opposite - by the plurality of
norms and values and the awareness
that this plurality is an indispensable
condition of autonomous society and
free individuality - of the values which
the allegedly ‘nihilistic’ sociology put
on the top of its agenda. The difference
between the orthodox and the new so-
ciology is not between commitment and
its absence - but between commitments
to different value priorities.
Commitment to the plurality of va-
lues and life-meanings does not mean
neutrality, nor does it mean indifference
to what is being chosen. There are bet-
ter choices and worse choices; some
may be even downright harmful. The
point is, however, that without taking
risk which polyvocality necessarily en-
tails, without allowing for the freedom
of choice which always includes the
possibility of wrong and damaging
ones, there will be no chance at all for
democracy and freedom.
If the orthodox sociology was preoc-
cupied with the conditions of human
obedience and conformity - sociology
bent on the promotion of autonomy and
freedom puts individual responsibility in
its focus. The major opposition in a mo-
dern ‘managed’ society was that be-
tween conformity and deviance; the
major opposition in a late-modern or
post-modern democratic, autonomous
society is one between taking up re-
sponsibility and seeking a shelter where
responsibility for one’s own action need
not be taken by the actor.
Living among a multitude of compe-
ting values, norms and life-styles, with-
out any guarantee of ‘being in the right’,
is hazardous and commands high psy-
chological price, and the temptation of
the second response, of hiding from the
requisites of responsible choice, is today
as strong as it never was before. As Ju-
lia Kristeva puts it - “it is a rare person
who does not invoke a primal shelter
to compensate for personal disarray”
(Kristeva 1993:2). And we all are, to a
greater or lesser extent, sometimes
more and sometimes less, in that state
of ‘personal disarray’. We dream then
of a great simplification; we engage on
our own account, unprompted, in the
‘regressive fantasies’ of which the ima-
ges of pre-natal womb and walled-up
home are prime inspirations. The search
for a ‘primal shelter’ is ‘the other’ of
responsibility, just like deviance and
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rebellion were ‘the other’ of conformity.
Our time is a time of neotribes as
much as it is the time of freedom and a
time of resentment of difference as
much as a time of its enjoyment. Both
are born of the same social condition,
are bound to share each other’s compa-
ny and can go away only together. Post-
modernity is, to put it in the nutshell, a
time of constant, everyday choice - for
humanity as a whole as much as for the
individual men and women. This alrea-
dy renders a noncommittal sociology an
impossibility. And indeed seeking a mo-
rally neutral stance among the many
brands of sociology practiced today,
stretching all the way from the outspo-
kenly libertarian and to the staunchly
communitarian, would be a vain effort.
Sociologists may deny or forget the
‘world-view’ effects of their work only
at the expense of forfeiting that respon-
sibility of choice which every other hu-
man being faces daily. What is at stake
is our tolerance to difference and soli-
darity with the different, our readiness
to see through the variety of forms of
life to the common core of humanity,
marked first and foremost by the uni-
versal right to one’s own identity. What
is at stake, in other words, is the new,
this time freely built, universality of hu-
man beings, resulting from mutual re-
spect of men and women who have
freely chosen their own ways of being
human. And the job of sociology in all
this is to see to it that all the choices are
genuinely free, and that they remain
such for the duration of humanity.
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